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cate of public convenience and necessity, regardless of any reasons
urged against it which do not pertain directly to the traveling public.
GREGORY GRAMLING
Automobiles: "Family doctrine", making owner responsible for
child's negligence, not recognized in Wisconsin.-The so-called
family doctrine as applied in some states does not obtain in Wisconsin,
and the father is not responsible for the negligent operation of his auto-
mobile by his minor child merely because of the relationship existing
between them, but liability must be predicated on the principals of
agency.' A man may be a guest in his own automobile while it is being
driven by his son.2 In this case the son was on an errand of his own.
but had invited his father, the owner of the automobile used, to ride
with him. Held that even though the father was the owner of the car,
he was simply the guest of his son on this particular trip, and since the
son was not about the business of the parent, but on his own private
affairs, the father was in no way liable.
In a most recent case-a minor daughter, nineteen years of age, drove
the family automobile without parental permission and, while on the
way to town to purchase a watermelon for her own use, pleasure and
satisfaction (for she was the only one in the family who indulged)
struck and injured plaintiff. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
the theory that it was the father's duty to furnish necessities of life did
not apply, and as the daughter was engaged in her own affairs, just as
much as if she had driven to town to mail a letter or buy a bag of candy,
the father could not be held liable.'
There are many states-in fact the majority-which are in accord. 4
The rule in all these jurisdiction seems to coincide with that of Massa-
chusetts: "The father is not liable for- the damages resulting from the
negligent operation of the family automobile unless it can be con-
clusively shown that the child was acting as the agent of the parent.
The burden 6f proof is on the plaintiff."'5
H. M. X.
Evidence: Admissions in course of negotiations for compromise
held admissable.-The defendant's daughter, nineteen years of age,
while driving her father's automobile, struck the plaintiff, causing per-
sonal injuries. In an action for the resulting damages a witness was
permitted to testify that he and the plaintiff interviewed the defendant
with reference to a settlement, and during the course of the conversation
the latter stated that at the time of the accident his daughter was in the
'Crossett v. Goelzer, 177 Wis. 455, x88 N. W. 627.
Giffert v. Kayser, 179 Wis. 571, 192 N.W. 26.
'Ruter v. Goohes, 173 Wis. 493.
'Papke v. Haerle, 207 N. W. 261.
flolentine v. Wyatt, 261 S. W. 308.
Ideinoto v. Schedecker, 226 P. 922.
Johnstone v. Stroock, 201 N.Y. Sup. 705.
Curtis v. Harrison, 253 S. W. 470.
Haskell v. Albiani, 139 N. E. 516. (See note 9, Marquette Law Review, 198.)
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prosecution of an errand upon which she had been sent by the de-
fendant.'
Since the so-called family doctrine does not obtain in this state as
applied to the use of an automobile, but liability must be predicated
upon principles of agency, the disposition of the case depended upon
the admissability of the testimony given by the witness, there having
been no other evidence offered on that point by the plaintiff. This par-
ticular point, involving the admission of a collateral fact arising during
a negotiation for a settlement has never been directly before the courts
of this state. Although it is well established that offers of compromise
or settlement are admissable in evidence as against the party making
them,2 in State Bank of Wisconsin v. Dutton,3 Cole, J. said:
There can be little doubt that the circuit court improperly admitted the evidence
offered on the trial which related to the propositions made by the appellants to
settle and compromise the claims sued upon. Notwithstanding the charge of the
trial judge to the jury expressly instructing them that they must disregard all that
portion of the evidence which related to the statements made by the defendants in
negotiating for the settlement the judgment is reversed and a new trial ordered.
Before discussing the admission of a collateral fact, made during the
course of effecting a compromise it is well to note the reason for ex-
cluding the offer itself. This court cites and approves the rule stated
by Wigmore in his work on evidence, sec. io6i, where he says:
The true reason for excluding an offer of compromise is that it does not ordi-
narily proceed from and imply a belief that the adversary's* claim is well founded,
but rather a belief that the further prosecution of that claim, whether well founded
or not, would in any event cause such annoyance as is preferrably avoided by the
payment of the sum offered; in short, the offer implies merely a desire for peace,
not a concession of wrong done. By this theory, the offer is excluded because, as
a matter of interpretation and inference, it does not signify an admission at all.
There is no concession of claims to be found in it, expressly or by implication.
It would follow then, conversely, that if a plain concession is in fact made, it is
receivable even though it forms part of an offer to compromise; and this much
has been well understood.
In Johnson v. Wilson,4 the court said:
There is no point better settled than that declarations and admissions, made by
one party to another while mutually engaged in effecting a settlement of their
difficulties, cannot be given in evidence.
In referring to this decision, Owen J. says:
The court cites no authority to support this broad statement and it is quite
apparent that the statement of the rule was inadvisedly framed. In none of the
'Papke v. Hearle, Wis. Feb., 1926; 207 N. W. 261.
'Johnson v. Wilson, i Pin. 65.
State Bank of Wisconsin v. Dutton, ii Wis. 371.
Richards v. Noyes, 44 Wis. 6og.
Jewett v. Fink, 47 Wis. 466; 2 N. W. 1124.
Taylor v. Tigerton Lumber Co., 134 Wis. 24; 114 N. W. 122.
Tobin v. Niclols, 156 Wis. 235; 145 N. W. 659.
John E. DeWolf Co. v. Harvey, 16i Wis. 535; 154 N. W. 988.
3 11 Wis. 371.
'x Pin (Wis.) 65.
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other cases cited has the rule been stated so broadly, and in none of them have
admissions or declarations which were not offers of compromise been excluded.
The distinction between particular facts and the admission of an
offer of compromise is almost universally recognized and seems to have
been drawn at a very early date. In Jones v. Foxhall,5 Sir John Romilly
said:
I shall as far as I am able, in all cases, endeavor to suppress a practice which,
when I was first with the profession was rarely, if ever, ventured upon, but which,
according to my experience, has been common of late, namely, that of attempting
to convert offers of compromise into admissions and acts prejudicial to the parties
making them. If this were permitted, the effect would be that no attempt to com-
promise a suit would ever be made.
From this statement it can readily be understood that the purpose was
not to exclude evidence and acts of admissions, as such, however preju-
dicial to the party making them, but to prevent the converting of offers
of compromise into such acts and admissions.
A very able illustration is given by Dewey, J. in Dickenson v.
Dickensoni:
The rules of evidence exclude to some extent and under certain circumstances
the declarations and admissions of a party. An instance of exclusion of testimony
is that of an offer of one party to another to pay a sum of money, or other valuable
consideration, with a view to a compromise of the matter in controversy. It must
be permitted to men to buy their peace, without being prejudiced by a rejection
of their offers. Hence evidence of such offers or proposals are irrelevant and they
are not to be taken as admissions of the legal liability of the party making them.
But there is a distinction existing between the cases of an offer of a sum of money
to settle a controversy and admissions of particular facts, connected with the cause,
made by a party pending a negotiation for a compromise.
The solution of the question is amply elucidated in the following
passage, Homer C. J. in Hartford Bridge Co. v. Granger7 : "If an ad-
mission, however, is made because it is a fact, the evidence to prove it is
competent, whatever may have prompted the declaration."
The courts sometimes submit to the jury as a question of fact whether
the statement was intended as an admission or as an offer of compro-
mise,8 and in Colburn v. Grotan9 it was held to be a question of fact
for the judge.
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